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Abstract:  
Moving beyond the post-political framing of the climate change debate, 
scholars have tried to show that scientific practice is based on politically 
significant forms of social construction. While sympathizing with this 
attempt, this paper questions their use of the term ‘political’. Drawing on post-
foundational political theory (Mouffe, Lefort) and focusing on the example of 
climate denialism, it argues that the relation between science and the political 
constitutes a double bind: while upholding an original distinction between 
science and the political is untenable, representing science in political terms 
is impossible, because of the specific way the scientific field is symbolically 
instituted. 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the course of the last decade, a significant body of scholarly literature 
has shown how many mainstream environmental discourses, and in particular 
discourses concerning climate change, are depoliticized, as they exhibit a 
consensual or techno-scientific logic which tends to make key political 
dimensions of the climate crisis invisible (Bettini, 2013; Brand, Bullard, 
Lander, & Mueller, 2009; Goeminne, 2010, 2012; MacGregor, 2014; Machin, 
2013; Maeseele, 2015; Oosterlynck & Swyngedouw, 2010; Pepermans & 
Maeseele, 2014; self-reference; Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010a, 2013; Zizek, 
2007). That which is of the essence of ‘the political’, such as conflicts or 
power relations, is often misrecognized in discourses on ecological 
modernization, the green economy or sustainable consumption, precisely 
because they represent environmental questions in technocratic, consensual, 
or individualized terms (self-reference). The result is that social and political 
antagonisms, contradictory interests and power are rendered invisible and 
therefore uncontestable. This is not only a problem from the point of view of 
democracy, which requires one acknowledges conflict and power (Lefort, 
1988; Mouffe, 2006). It can also hamper the effectiveness of environmental 
transformations as it makes us blind to structural and political obstacles and 
challenges (self-reference).  
The role of science is a key topic in the debate on post-politics in the 
context of climate  change (Goeminne, 2010, 2012; Machin, 2013; Maeseele, 
2015; Pepermans, 2015; Swyngedouw, 2010b, 2011). Goeminne (2010, p. 
208) stresses for example the ‘perfidious role played by science in 
environmental issues’. The latter are not only ‘predominantly staged 
scientifically’, science is also usually portrayed as being concerned with mere 
‘matters of facts’, and therefore as the ground for the provision of effective 
solutions.  
Much less scholarship exists, however, on how to repoliticize the 
climate debate, i.e. represent it in such a way that power, exclusions, 
oppositions of interests and underlying values and visions of society become 
visible and contestable. A number of scholars have argued we need to 
reconsider the relationship between science and politics in this context and to 
uncover that scientific practice is always based on politically significant forms 
of social construction (Demeritt, 2001, 2006; Latour, 2004a; Wynne, 2010). 
For example, David Demerrit argues that scientific practices inevitably rely 
on ‘tacit social and epistemic commitments’, stating not only that science is 
used in ways that are not neutral from a social and political point of view, but 
also that there is an ‘irreducibly social dimension of scientific knowledge and 
practice’ as such, as a result of which ‘a politics’ is built into ‘the technical 
practices of science itself’ (Demeritt, 2001, pp. 307, 308, 309).  
Similarly, according to Goeminne, scientific research can never be 
politically neutral, because ‘matters of fact’ are always also ‘matters of 
concern’ which are constructed or composed in a spe
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composition inevitably generates certain exclusions (Goeminne, 2012). 
Combining a Mouffean analysis of the political with insights from social 
constructivist approaches to scientific practices, Goeminne argues that the 
socially constructed and therefore political nature of scientific facts should be 
acknowledged, and that this can help overcome the depoliticization of the 
climate debate. 
Social constructivism is confronted with an important challenge, 
however, namely climate denialism, which at first sight appears to have 
instrumentalized the disclosure of the moment of social and political 
construction in climate science in order to refute the latter. This is evidently 
not a line of thought which social constructivists such as Demerrit would agree 
with. On the contrary, he calls for ‘a more reflexive understanding of science 
as a situated and ongoing social practice’ (Demeritt, 2001, p. 309). In other 
words, we need to acknowledge that all science is based on social practices of 
construction, which are not a basis for refuting science, but which should lead 
to more reflexivity on the part of the scientific community. 
Being highly critical of climate denialism, Goeminne understands the 
latter precisely against the backdrop of the depoliticization of the climate 
debate: ‘climate denial constitutes […] a symptomatic outburst of the political 
in a completely depoliticized landscape’ (Goeminne, 2012, p. 7). To ground 
this statement, he refers to the work of political philosophers, in particular 
Chantal Mouffe, who developed a sophisticated analysis of the political and 
depolitization (Mouffe, 1993, 2006, 2013). For Mouffe, depoliticization 
occurs when one fails to acknowledge the constructed (and therefore 
contingent) nature of the social and the fact that each such construction entails 
certain exclusions and can therefore generate conflicts or antagonisms. Her 
key argument, which she draws from Carl Schmitt (1996), is that by pursuing 
consensus and misrecognizing or concealing conflict, the latter often tends to 
become more intense and even unmanageable. Conflicts can only be kept 
within certain bounds by making them visible, and by pursuing reciprocal 
recognition among adversaries, so she argues. Applying this framework to the 
climate debate, Amanda Machin suggests that ‘the focus upon consensus 
about climate change (…) actually encourages the growth of passionate 
climate change denial’ (Machin, 2013, p. 96). According to her, the intensity 
of climate denialists’ opposition to mainstream opinions follows from the 
scientific and technical way climate change has been framed, which leaves 
‘only two alternatives: agree or reject’ (Machin, 2013, p. 97). Building upon 
that argument, Maeseele states that ‘(a) discursive construction of climate 
change in terms of an exclusionary scientific consensus (…) impedes 
democratic citizenship, since it encourages either political apathy by 
alienating people from owning the issue or polarization between acceptance 
and denial’ (Maeseele, 2015, p. 393). 
The empirical evidence underpinning the observation that climate 
denialists somehow bring back a ‘political’ dimension into the debate at first 
instance seems overwhelming. Is it not the case that climate denialism has 
sparked a tremendous conflict and debate in society, radically pitting groups 
of scientists, politicians and civil society organizations against each other? 
Well-known climate denialists such as Bjørn Lomborg have variously 
questioned that climate change is a reality, that it is as serious as is often 
thought, and that it is possible to avoid it through certain policy measures, thus 
sparking heroic debates (Lomborg, 2001, 2007). Nevertheless, the question 
should be asked whether it is correct and useful to understand climate 
denialism as a ‘return of the political’ into the field of climate change 
(Goeminne, 2012).  
In order to answer this question, we have to address the way in which 
constructivists use the term ‘political’, and the way they attempt to fold post-
foundational political theory into their study of scientific practice. In this 
paper, we will in particular focus on the seminal work of Gert Goeminne, who 
over the last few years has most consistently attempted to integrate a 
Mouffean account of the political into science and technology studies. While 
sympathizing with his project, this paper develops three objections to it. First, 
we will argue that Goeminne underestimates the moment of symbolization in 
Mouffe’s theory of the political, and too easily leaps from the observation of 
exclusions in processes of social construction to the presence of political 
antagonism. Second, we show that as a result, the term ‘political’ is inflated 
and loses its specific meaning. Third, we argue that on this basis, the meaning 
of climate denialism cannot be adequately grasped as a ‘return of the political’ 
(Goeminne, 2012). In the next section, the first two arguments will be 
addressed in detail. Thereafter, we will develop our own account of the 
symbolic institution of science, inspired by Claude Lefort’s variant of post-
foundational political theory, which has many affinities with Mouffe’s. This 
account is fully compatible with the constructivist project, even though it leads 
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to a more critical view on the description of science in ‘political’ terms. As 
we will argue, like all social fields, the field of science (understood in this 
context as the study of phenomena like climate change) is symbolized or 
represented in particular ways, and scientists inevitably give meaning to their 
activity in terms of these symbolizations. Our argument is that the specific 
system of meanings governing the scientific field makes the latter’s 
politicization (understood here as the self-description of this field in political 
terms) particularly difficult, not to say impossible. Finally, we will bring this 
analysis to bear on the debate on climate denialism, showing that it cannot be 
analyzed in terms of a ‘return of the political’. Overall, the aim of this paper 
is to develop a more nuanced understanding of the aporetic nature of the 
relation between science and the political, from within a broadly conceived 
constructivist framework.  
 
Reading politics into science 
What does it mean to state that science is political? While it is common to use 
the term ‘political’ in a post-positive description of the inevitably situated and 
perspectival nature of scientific practices, only recently scholars have started 
to systematically integrate post-foundational theories of the political into this 
approach. The work of Goeminne is a case in point. Drawing on Latour’s 
distinction between matters of fact and matters of concern (2004b) Goeminne 
underlines how scientific facts always express ‘a particular way of being 
concerned with the world’ (2013, p. 97). These concerns inform the way in 
which scientists ‘compose’ or frame ‘different pieces together into a 
meaningful whole’ (p. 98). He refers to climate modelling as an example of 
such ‘concernful work of composition’. Key to actually existing approaches 
to climate modelling is that social relations that are the root causes of 
greenhouse gas emissions are excluded from the models, as the focus is 
exclusively on the physical properties of these gases. This shows that ‘the 
scientific composition of global climate change’ inevitably takes certain 
things into account and others not (p. 98).  
This disclosure of in- and exclusions, generated by scientists’ work of 
composition, provides Goeminne with the conceptual bridge to post-
foundational political theory, and more in particular, Chantal Mouffe’s 
influential account of the concept of the political, in which the concept of 
exclusion similarly plays a pivotal role. ‘In stating that science is political’, he 
argues, ‘I merely claim that it differentiates between the internalities and 
externalities of its composition’ (Goeminne, 2013, p. 103). The question is 
whether this conceptual bridge is substantial enough to allow for the 
integration of Mouffe’s concept of the political into constructivist analyses of 
science, and thus for redescribing science in political terms.  
In The Concept of the Political, Mouffe argues that ‘every identity is 
relational and that the affirmation of a difference is a precondition for the 
existence of any identity’ (Mouffe, 2006, p. 15). Goeminne concludes that 
‘every identity is constituted in and through its necessarily antagonistic 
relations with diverse others’ (Goeminne, 2013, p. 103). As the concept of 
antagonism is the key to Mouffe’s understanding of the political, the evident 
conclusion is that the play of in- and exclusions provides the basis for calling 
science ‘political’. But this is a non sequitur. What Goeminne fails to 
appreciate, is that the relational character of identity does not ipso facto entail 
that each identity is produced antagonistically. Indeed, Mouffe explicitly 
states that the relational character of identity does not mean that ‘such a 
relation is necessarily (…) an antagonistic one’ (Mouffe, 2006, p. 15). This is 
only a possibility.  
To grasp what is exactly at stake, it is important to underline that there 
is a significant shift in Mouffe’s (and Laclau’s) work on this issue. In their 
early co-written book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe 
analyse how identity and objectivity are always discursively constituted 
through radical exclusion. Precisely because of this, however, a discourse can 
never arrive at full closure. Closure presupposes exclusion but this at the same 
time renders full closure impossible: a discourse continues to be haunted and 
destabilized by what it excludes. Laclau and Mouffe called the experience of 
this ‘limit’ ‘antagonism’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 122). To summarize the 
argument very bluntly: identity or objectivity are always discursively 
produced, discourse always generates exclusions and these exclusions 
manifest themselves as antagonisms, which Mouffe would later describe as a 
key dimension of the political. This line of thought underpins Goeminne’s 
project to expand this ‘non-essentialist, antagonistic thesis from the social to 
the natural sphere, arguing that the construction of order more generally 
(identity, knowledge, etc.) is relational, its condition of existence being the 
affirmation of an exclusion’ (Goeminne, 2013, p. 104). In other words, there 
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is antagonism, and therefore politics, involved in the way scientists ‘compose’ 
their object, such as climate change. 
 
 
The symbolic institution of the scientific field 
 
A key contribution of social constructivists is to have put the division between 
scientific knowledge (e.g. on climate change) and politics into question, in an 
attempt to show that not only the application of science is political, but that 
scientific practice is always already political. From this perspective, they 
criticize the political (or depoliticizing) effects of views that demarcate 
science and politics and assume science to be neutral. Demerrit deplores for 
example that ‘global climate change has been constructed in narrowly 
technical and reductionist scientific terms’ (Demeritt, 2001, p. 312). A key 
role is played by the IPCC in this regard, as it has ‘tried as much as possible 
to divorce the scientific study of this problem from the social and political 
contexts of both its material production and its cognitive understanding’ (p. 
312). As he states: the ‘analytical division of labour between science and 
politics serves some obvious political functions’ (p. 313). The proclaimed 
neutrality of science makes it easier for it to be instrumentalized by policy-
makers. Moreover, the focus of scientists on CO2 as such makes us blind to 
socially and politically different forms of CO2 emissions (Swyngedouw, 
2007) (as if CO2 emissions from luxury consumption equal those of survival 
consumption), which can be politically interesting for certain groups of 
policy-makers (self-reference). 
Following Gieryn, Demerrit argues that ‘boundary making is one of the 
most important ways in which science is socially constructed’ (Demeritt, 
2001, p. 321; Gieryn, 1995). Questioning these boundaries, a key aim of the 
constructivist approach is to reveal forms of continuity between science on the 
one hand, and society and politics on the other, or to show that the boundaries 
between science and politics are porous. However, relativizing these 
boundaries is one thing, redescribing science in political terms, as Goeminne 
tries to do, quite another. In order to understand what is at stake, it is important 
to investigate the specific representational dynamics underpinning this 
process of ‘boundary making’. In this way, we want to nuance Goeminne’s 
thesis that science is political because it can ‘be regarded as a scene of 
struggle’ about what needs to be in- and excluded (Goeminne, 2013, p. 105).  
 The point we want to make is that the very way the scientific field is 
symbolically instituted makes it impossible to redescribe or resymbolize it in 
political terms such as struggle and antagonism. On  this basis, we will argue 
that the relation between science and the political is characterized by a double 
bind: the construction of scientific matters of concern appears to necessarily 
lead to a political understanding of science, whereas the representational order 
through which the scientific field is constituted makes this impossible. 
Importantly, we will develop this argument while remaining on constructivist 
grounds, namely by investigating the social process of representation 
constitutive of the scientific field. 
In this attempt, we draw inspiration from Claude Lefort, another 
representative of post-foundational political theory, with whom Chantal 
Mouffe has many affinities, but who stresses even more strongly the central 
role of representation or symbolization (Flynn, 2005; Lefort, 1986, 1988). 
Lefort argues that there is no society without an interpretation of itself: an 
image in terms of which citizens interpret society, social relations and their 
place within them. He calls the order of representations or symbolizations in 
terms of which society is given meaning the ‘symbolic order’ of society, or 
‘the political’. In a democratic society, the sphere of ‘politics’ (the parliament, 
government and the whole arena of political debate and struggle) provides the 
context where this image of society is enacted and becomes visible. For 
example, the configuration of the parliament in terms of the opposition 
between majority and opposition provides society with a specific image of 
itself, namely as divided. Moreover, it shows that this division should not be 
a problem, but that it is legitimate, and that there are adequate spaces and fair 
ways to deal with it. Society is thus ‘instituted’ (given meaning) and 
delineated through a set of representations, which, crucially, always take place 
in the name of something, or refer to a specific (symbolic) ‘place’. As Lefort 
argues, the fact that society ‘is organized as one despite (or because of) its 
multiple divisions (…) implies a reference to a place from which it can be 
seen, read and named’ (Lefort, 1988, p. 225). This is a (symbolic) place of 
power. Society can be instituted, for example, in the name of the people, the 
nation, or the ideas of liberty and equality. This symbolic pole, Lefort argues, 
‘manifests society’s self-externality’. This externality is not ‘real’, but 
5 
 
symbolic: a society defines itself by referring to something which is 
(symbolically) outside itself, a place from which society is given meaning.  
The symbolic order in pre-democratic societies is radically different from 
that in democratic societies. Primitive societies, for example, are often 
instituted from the place of the ancestors, a place which is (again, 
symbolically) transcendent to the social order. This place is still a place of 
power, but it does not have a political character or is not recognizable as 
political. To the extent that there is a kind of secular administration, it ‘is only 
an intra-worldly mandatory of a transcendent sacred order’ (Braeckman, 2014, 
p. 5). From our modern vantage point, we can unmask the activities of priests, 
druids or magicians as the exercise of power, and therefore as somehow 
political, but the people living in such a society cannot do this, as they think 
their society as instituted from the transcendent place of the ancestors or the 
gods, whereby the priests do not make political decisions but merely incarnate 
the order that has already been fixed. 
A democratic society, in contrast, situates this place of power within 
itself. The nation or the people for example, are principles or ideas which 
transcend all actually existing social groups, but are nevertheless immanent to 
society. A kind of ‘immanent transcendence’ is therefore at play (Singer, 
2013, p. 194). This ‘immanentization’ is of key importance for democracy: if 
society has its foundation within itself, and if this is rendered visible in the 
sphere of politics, it can think of this foundation as alterable, in contrast to a 
situation where the place from which society is instituted is wholly 
transcendent. Therefore, the representations through which a democratic 
society is given meaning can be contested and politicized. 
In a democratic society, Lefort (1988) argues moreover, knowledge 
became symbolically separated from power and the Law, implying that those 
who have power cannot claim to incarnate knowledge: it is not because one 
holds power that one also holds the truth. Apart from this insight, Lefort never 
addresses issues that are directly relevant for the topic of this paper, namely 
the relation between science and the political. Yet, in our view, applying key 
ideas of Lefort to how the field of science is instituted can yield interesting 
insights into the relation between science and the political. Indeed, the field of 
science similarly requires a specific set of representations, or a symbolic order 
in terms of which it is delineated, unified and given meaning. These 
representations are claims which are made ‘in the name of’ something. In 
other words, the field of science is instituted by referring to a place in terms 
of which it is given meaning. The question, therefore, becomes: in which name 
do scientists speak when they delineate their field of operation? What kind of 
transcendence is at stake? Following the above analysis, the answer to this 
question will be key to assessing the possibility for science to become a field 
of politicization and contestation.  
Our contention is that the (symbolic) place from which the field of (e.g. 
climate) science is instituted is that of what Roy Bhaskar calls an intransitive 
object. Bhaskar describes this object as ‘the real structure or mechanism that 
exists and acts quite independently of men and the conditions which allow 
men access to it’ (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 6). Our aim is not to intervene in the 
discussion amongst philosophers of science concerning the question whether 
or not intransitive objects exist (Bhaskar, 2002). The point is that scientists 
actually give meaning to their activity through representations which (perhaps 
implicitly or imaginarily) point to the place of this intransitive objectivity – 
which is not the same as the ‘composed’ object of study or ‘matter of concern’. 
In other words, what we want to stress is that scientists not only ‘compose’ 
scientific matters of concern, as Goeminne argues, but also develop 
representations through which they give meaning to their activities. What we 
focus on, is thus not how scientists ‘represent nature’, but how they give 
meaning to their own field of activity.  
In a debate with Ernesto Laclau, Roy Bhaskar puts it bluntly (Laclau & 
Bhaskar, 2007, p. 14): ‘Did global warming exist prior to its discursive 
constitution?’, he asks, suggesting that even though the scientific practices 
through which we develop knowledge on the climate rely on social 
constructions (transitive objects), scientific claims are made in the name of an 
intransitive object. If one would ask climate scientists whether ‘global 
warming went on long before we had the concept of it’, more than 99% would 
undoubtedly answer affirmatively. Scientists speak in the name of an object 
which is intransitive, i.e. which is not affected as such by its representation, 
or by being known. In other words, they speak in the name of an object that is 
considered transcendent to the socially constituted field of science itself, and 
in terms of which this field is instituted as such. Even if in their scientific 
practices, they ‘compose’ their matters of concern, without the symbolic 
reference to this object, the specific meaning of their activity would be lost. 
Once again, we can leave open the question whether this symbolic operation 
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is warranted or not. What interests us, is that this self-understanding of 
scientists will have important consequences for how the field of science is 
given meaning, and for the extent to which this field allows for politicization 
(i.e., redescription in political terms).  
Even though objects of knowledge, methods and models are socially 
constructed in politically significant ways, scientists cannot possibly accept 
that the (symbolic) place from which their activities draw their meaning is a 
social construction or a place immanent to society. Even though all 
constructions which scientists create in the process of knowledge production 
can be transitive (as Laclau stresses), the field of science is instituted, and 
acquires its meaning and identity, from a specific place, in whose name 
scientists speak, and which is that of an intransitive object. It needs to be 
underscored that this argument is not essentialist, suggesting there is an 
essence to science setting it apart from other fields in society. On the contrary, 
our argument remains within a broadly constructivist framework, focusing on 
the representations through which the field of science is actually given 
meaning.  
The question whether the place from where a social field is instituted is 
immanent or transcendent has important implications for the dynamics of 
contestation. It is precisely because in a democratic society, the place from 
where society is given meaning is an immanent transcendence (namely the 
people, which is not a ‘real’ collectivity, but a symbolic pole of identification) 
that politicians who claim to speak in the people’s name can be contested 
through counter-claims or counter-representations. This will be a process 
which is openly recognized and given meaning as political, namely as a power 
struggle with contingent outcomes. The dynamics of contestation within the 
scientific field will be different. ‘Contestation’ (which is actually an 
inadequate, because too politicized term in this framework) will be conducted 
in the name of a fully transcendent object, which does allow for an 
understanding of scientific oppositions in political terms (i.e. as a ‘struggle’, 
let alone a ‘power struggle’). On both levels, a different understanding of 
foundation is at play. As Oliver Marchart has shown, theories of the political 
argue that a social order has no ultimate foundations, or that any foundation is 
only contingent, which is precisely what makes them contestable and 
politicizable (Marchart, 2007). However, the field of science will be thought 
of as having a strong foundation (whether this is ultimately reachable or 
knowable is, again, a different matter). In the end, science is grounded in ‘an’ 
objectivity – however a specific matter of concern is subsequently ‘composed’ 
through concrete research practices -, which remains what it is, whether it is 
adequately represented or not. A genuinely political representation of social 
relations or practices, in contrast, lacks such an ultimate foundation and also 
makes that visible (e.g. by openly allowing for contestation through channels 
ranging from elections to civil disobedience).  
The result of this analysis is a double bind. Both the social constructivists 
who question the divide between science and politics and those who affirm 
this divide appear to be right to some extent. On the one hand, scientific 
practices can be shown to be based on social constructions with potential 
political ramifications. On the other hand, the disclosure of such a process of 
social construction cannot yield a political self-understanding of science, 
simply because the field of science cannot possibly become an arena of 
struggle that is political, which would require that this struggle is conducted 
in the name of immanent-transcendent principles. On the one hand, a political 
understanding of science appears to be necessary, given the evidence 
constructivists provide. On the other hand, it is impossible, precisely because 
of the way the scientific field is symbolically instituted.  
The implication is that it is always possible to reveal or unmask scientists’ 
social constructions and the exclusions thus generated, but that the answer of 
scientists can only be to become ‘even more scientific’. It is possible and 
necessary to unmask the porous boundary between science and politics, but 
the reaction of scientists will be to symbolically reaffirm this boundary and 
the transcendent place from which their field acquires its meaning. Each time 
natural science is challenged as being political or ideological, this urges 
scientists to reaffirm the boundary even more strongly and guard it more 
closely. The nature of the symbolic institution of science makes it impossible 
for scientists to think that the place from which their activity is given meaning 
is immanent.  
To sum up, the symbolic reference to a dimension of intransitivity 
constitutes the condition of possibility of the very meaningfulness of scientific 
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discourse. Without it, the whole (natural) scientific project would fall apart.1 
The symbolic place of this object – whether one considers it as fictitious or 
not – functions in such a way as to immunize science from genuine 
politicization (i.e., resymbolization in political terms such as power struggles 
and antagonisms). As a result, one cannot represent a natural scientific 
practice as both ‘scientific’ and as ‘political’ at the same time. In this sense, 
natural science fundamentally differs from art: a piece of art can overtly 
represent itself as political, and yet remain a genuine piece of art. In science, 
that combination is not possible: the self-representation of science is at odds 
with what a genuinely political or politicized self-representation would entail. 
 
 
Science and society 
An entirely different matter, however, is when climate scientists take part 
in public or policy debates. At that moment, boundaries do get blurred, as 
scientists can no longer claim to speak merely in the name of a ‘matter of fact’, 
but start to speak in the name of a ‘matter of concern’, to use Goeminne’s (and 
Latour’s)terminology (2010, p. 212).2 Putting scientists’ public discourse into 
question, however, does not amount to a politicization of science, but to a 
politicization of the place of science in society, which is not the same thing. It 
is evidently possible to politicize science’s relation to society (for example, 
the way science is embedded in particular scientific institutions, relies on 
flows of funding, etcetera). It is to this relation that we are turning now, to 
make two arguments. First, we will argue that unmasking power and exclusion 
in scientific practices or in the social constructions developed by climate 
scientists is not a necessary condition for criticizing and overcoming 
depoliticization in the climate debate. Second, we will argue that climate 
denialism does not lead to a return of the political in the field of science, nor 
of the climate debate as such, but relies on a number of deeply depoliticizing 
discursive operations. 
Let us first address the problem how to address post-politics in the climate 
debate. The key problem, in our view, resides not with climate science as such, 
                                                          
1 In the framework of this article, we cannot engage with the specificity of the social sciences. But it 
is evident that this analysis cannot straightforwardly be applied to the social sciences, where the 
possibility for a political-self-understanding of scientists is much greater, maybe even inevitable. 
but with how it is translated and feeds into the debates about the root causes 
of climate change, and about strategies and alternatives. Importantly, these 
latter debates do not require one adopts a standpoint that is transcendent to 
society. Three points are relevant in this context. First, the translation from 
science to policy is a translation between two social fields which are 
symbolically instituted in radically different ways, and whose self-
understanding therefore also radically differs. Second, it is important to heed 
the symbolic separation of power, law and knowledge, which is key to 
democracy, as we stated above. Those who hold power cannot claim to 
incarnate knowledge, and the development of knowledge ought to remain 
autonomous from political power.  Contrary to a theocratic regime, the holder 
of political power in a democratic society is not ipso facto the holder of the 
truth. Third, it is impossible to directly deduce strategic political precepts from 
a scientific analysis of the state of the planet. The real problem of 
depoliticization is located here: in the idea that there is a one-to-one, non-
contingent relation between natural scientific insights on the state of the 
climate and the policies and strategies needed to tackle it (Maeseele, 2015, p. 
393; Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 602).  
The problem with the mainstream or hegemonic climate discourse (as 
presented by a large majority of government and policy bodies, corporations 
and big NGOs) is that it focuses primarily on the nature of the climate problem 
and its effects, heavily relying on the reports of the IPCC and other natural 
science studies. More specifically, the focus is on CO2 and its effects, making 
abstraction from the socially embedded root causes (Demeritt, 2001; 
Swyngedouw, 2007, 2010a). To use Mouffe and Laclau’s terminology, CO2 
is the ‘nodal point’ around which the dominant discourse is woven (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001). In other words, in the dominant discourse, CO2 comes to stand 
for the whole of the catastrophe we are facing: in order to ward it off, we have 
to reduce CO2 emissions. A typical, post-political result of this is the slogan 
used by the British government: ‘Act on CO2’ (Urry, 2011, p. 90). The result 
is a strange kind of politicization which actually is not one: there is talk about 
conflict and struggle, but one that focuses on an externalized and socially 
2 The fact that ‘matters of fact’ are actually always already ‘matters of concern’, as Goeminne shows, 
is not relevant for understanding the symbolic institution of the field of science: what counts is how 
scientists understand themselves and their activity, not how social constructivists describe their 
activities.  
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disembodied enemy: CO2, against which we are all united (Swyngedouw, 
2007, 2010a).  
At the same time, the analysis of human-societal root causes, strategies 
and alternatives is almost absent from the mainstream discourse, and to the 
extent such an analysis is made, it often remains rather superficial. In so far as 
future images are presented in the mainstream discourse, the choice seems to 
be between retrofitting the current situation and a completely apocalyptic 
catastrophe (Swyngedouw, 2010a; Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2014). Clearly, this 
kind of choice tends to paralyze the debate.  
In this context, policy measures are often presented as if they are directly 
derivable from natural scientific analyses. If the IPCC, for example, puts 
forward technologies such as nuclear energy to bring about a reduction in 
fossil fuel consumption, as it did in its 2007 report, it goes beyond its core task 
(namely providing information on the state of the climate and the effects of 
further global warming), making a leap from science to strategy, without fully 
recognizing the politically sensitive nature of the domain it is thus entering 
(IPCC, 2007). Upholding a claim to scientificity in the domain of strategy has 
important symbolic effects. A failure to fully acknowledge this can lead to 
forms of technocracy that are fundamentally post-political. The actual 
question, therefore, is how to create a terrain for political plurality to appear 
within the debate on strategies, root causes and alternatives, and to make sure 
the symbolic self-understanding of natural science does not impede forms of 
politicization on these terrains.  
 
Climate denialism as depoliticization 
Interestingly, a somewhat similar analysis can be made concerning climate 
denialism. At first sight, it might indeed appear as if climate denialists 
repoliticize the climate debate. Jean-Marie Dedecker, a well-known Belgian 
politician, climate denialist and a radical opponent of government intervention 
and regulation, calls environmentalism ‘a new powerful religion’ and 
forcefully attacks the apocalyptic imaginaries that are present in many climate 
discourses, because they stifle voices of dissent (Dedecker, 2010). Although 
his political outlook is radically different from Slavoj Žižek’s, Dedecker’s 
argument strikes a chord with Žižek’s critique of post-political forms of 
environmentalism, which use fear in order to mobilize and unify the mass of 
the people and to make them submit to forms of technocratic and depoliticized 
governance (Zizek, 2007). But does this also mean that the typical climate 
denialists’ discourse  amounts to a genuine return of the political within the 
climate debate?  
The discursive strategies many climate denialists adopt are actually based 
on a number of typical depoliticizing operations. A first move is to focus on 
the field of natural science itself. At first sight, it looks as if climate denialists 
(re)introduce a political conflict as they state there is no agreement with regard 
to the issue of climate change on the scientific terrain. But what they actually 
do, is to reproduce the sophisticated ideological move that is typical of many 
forms of depoliticization. They often combat specific climate policies, such as 
government regulation (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), but insinuate that their 
combat is grounded in natural science. In so doing, they immunize their 
political positions, at least to a certain extent, from contestation and critique. 
Indeed, whether they claim that mainstream climate science is utterly wrong 
or that it is biased as a result of practices of social construction, they cannot 
but claim to speak in the name of a more adequate ‘scientific truth’. Climate 
denialists thus shift the debate from the plane of politics and policy proper, to 
that of natural science. In this context, they exploit the truism that science 
never gives 100% certainty in order to support their claim that the scientific 
debate is far from over, and to legitimate their own position (Oreskes & 
Conway, 2010). In doing so, however, they ward off a genuinely political 
debate.  
Furthermore, as they attack climate science because it would lead to 
government intervention and regulation (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), they also 
suggest the latter would follow in a logical and unilinear way from the former. 
More than anyone else, therefore, they tend to depoliticize the relation 
between natural science and politics. Indeed, instead of directly engaging in a 
political or ideological debate concerning for example the desirability of more 
government regulation, climate denialists present their own claims as 
grounded in what they consider as science, and thereby conceal what is 
politically really at stake for them (Jacques, 2008, p. 28; Oreskes & Conway, 
2010). Therefore, while denouncing mainstream climate scientists for only 
engaging in ideology and defending political positions, this is paradoxically 
what they are doing themselves: in the best case, they use or even 
instrumentalize ‘science’ (or what they consider to be so) to defend their 
policy preferences. Even if there would be authentic climate denialists who do 
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not instrumentalize science in order to defend certain political projects or 
policy preferences, but who would merely posit a disagreement within the 
field of natural science itself, it is still difficult, and even impossible, to claim 
that the result is a return of the political within science as such.  
What climate denialists most often do, is not to disclose the social 
constructions of climate science, but rather to exploit inevitable uncertainties, 
gaps or open questions in the science in order to reinforce their own 
ideological positions. Climate denialists thus commit a crucial fallacy: they 
do as if political positions (such as advocating more state intervention in the 
economy) are deducible from natural scientific insights, and therefore, require 
alternative natural scientific foundations for their own political preferences. 
Seeking ultimate foundations is precisely what depoliticization is about 
(Marchart, 2007). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘While the climate skeptics have sought to refute climate change science by 
exposing the socially negotiated assumptions and uncertainties of the climate 
models, advocates of GHG reduction have responded by denying them 
altogether’, Demerrit argues (2001, p. 329). However, redescribing science in 
political terms provides little help in dealing with this situation. Rather, taking 
the self-representation of science seriously, the reflexivity Demerrit calls for 
can only lead to an acknowledgement of ‘socially negotiated assumptions and 
uncertainties’ in view of their scientific correction, and ultimately, 
neutralization (whether that is possible in principle or not is, again, not an 
issue here). Reflexivity will not open the field of science to ‘struggle’, but will 
lead to a more closely guarded drawing of boundaries, rather than opening 
them up, precisely because of the way the field of science is symbolically 
given meaning. To repeat, this will both be a necessity and ultimately an 
impossibility, as a result of which the drawing of boundaries between science 
and politics can never be finalised, but remains an ongoing process.  
This drawing of boundaries is surely a politically significant process, 
as it is about distinguishing what is to be understood in political terms and 
what is not. As Carl Schmitt, who was the first to have coined the distinction 
between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’, once stated, ‘any decision about whether 
something is unpolitical is always a political decision’ (Schmitt, 1988, p. 2). 
This means that there is something politically at stake in a decision to keep a 
certain terrain depoliticized. For example, Schmitt famously advocated the 
depoliticization of the economy, against the Marxist doctrine of the class 
struggle (Cristi, 1998; Schmitt, 1998). In a similar way, there is something 
political at stake when primitive societies locate the place from which they are 
instituted in a transcendental, supranatural realm. Or there is something 
politically relevant at stake when scientists give meaning to their activity from 
the vantage point of a transcendent, intransitive object. The political 
significance resides precisely in that it symbolically wards off politicization, 
both understood as external political interference and as a resymbolization or 
resignification of science in explicitly political terms (in terms of power, 
conflict, etcetera). 
The boundaries can of course be drawn and redrawn in various ways, 
and each of these will yield a different potential for politicization. In this 
sense, we do not take issue with scholars who discursively construct climate 
change in integrated social-ecological terms, and speak about socioecological 
assemblages (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003, 912), socio-natural 
entanglements, or social ecological configurations (Heynen, Kaika, & 
Swyngedouw, 2006, pp. 7, 2), stressing, for example, the social root causes of 
CO2 emissions and their socially differentiated effects. This mode of 
representation makes a politicization of the climate debate possible precisely 
because it situates the ‘place’ from which the debate is given meaning 
immanently (within society). This is possible and meaningful if we have a 
debate on the questions of root causes of ecological destruction, strategies and 
alternatives. Such a way of framing the discussion rightly challenges climate 
scientists to critically reflect on how they present their findings to a wider 
audience of scholars, policy-makers and citizens. Whether all greenhouse 
gases are portrayed equivalently, for example, or according to their social 
sources and effects, makes a significant difference for the dynamic of the 
political debate. In such a context, discourse has an effect on its object (albeit 
in very complex ways), which can be argued to be transitive as a social-
ecological object. But such a mode of representation does not amount to a 
return of the political in the study of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere per se.  
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To sum up, it is crucial to acknowledge the different ways in which 
different social fields are symbolically instituted. To the extent that we fail to 
understand the symbolic significance of the distinction between climate 
science and the sphere of politics proper, this can even amount to a 
depoliticization and de-democratization of society. It is a symptom of the fact 
that we fail to fully distinguish power, law and knowledge, which is a key 
presupposition of democracy. This led us to a slightly different interpretation 
of the relation between climate denialism and ‘the political’ than that of 
scholars such as Goeminne. To summarize, our point is threefold. First, 
climate denialists are not attempting to repoliticize climate science, but in fact 
(and inevitably, we would argue) reproduce, and even strengthen neutralizing 
and depoliticizing representations of science. Second, they often do this in 
order to reinforce their stances in the actual field of policy. They thus operate 
with the idea that policy proposals unambiguously follow from ‘correct’ 
natural science, which results in a depoliticization of the discussion on policy 
itself, which is deeply problematic. Finally, this post-political nature of 
climate denialism provides us with an illustration of the double bind that is 
characteristic of the relation between natural science and the political. If 
climate denialists have one merit, it is that they have forced us to re-think what 
it means to conduct (natural) science, and how science relates to the political, 
amongst other things. Without any doubt, we are increasingly becoming aware 
of the tremendous complexity of this fascinating question.. 
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